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The meta-problem of consciousness aims to explain the particularity of our 
intuitions about consciousness and how they trigger conceptual issues such as
the hard problem of consciousness. I propose in this article that these stem 
from a basic function of the brain : self-evidencing explanation. To make sense
of its sensory inputs, the brain is believed to build and test models of the state
of the world based on sensory information (Hohwy, 2016). This self-evidencing
process has been proposed to describe the type of inference performed by 
consciousness (Friston, 2018). I will show how this situation is viciously 
circular and prevents from proving the existence of conscious experience or 
explaining it without presupposing its existence. I will show how it accounts 
for the particularity of our intutions about consciousness and thus propose an 
solution to the meta-problem of consciousness using a formally defined 
process at the core of conscious inference.
1. Explaining conscious experience through conscious self-evidencing
1.a. Consciousness is self-evidencing
The hard-problem of consciousness is explaining the relationship between 
conscious experience and physical processes. This task has been deemed hard
because of the strength of the intuition that physical processes cannot 
possibly explain conscious experience, also called the explanatory gap 
(Levine, 1983). This problem has been opposed to easy problems, ie 
explaining features of consciousness that do not conflict with our intuitions 
about consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is explaining the 
particularity of our intuitions regarding conscious experience and has been 
considered an easy problem (Chalmers, 2018). It holds a particular place 
among easy problems since it could help to understand the root of what makes
the hard-problem of consciousness hard. To explain our intuitions about 
conscious experience, I start with examining the type of inference performed 
by the brain. 
The inference process performed by the brain has been described as 
being self-evidencing explanation (Hohwy, 2016). Self-evidencing occurs 
whenever “the information or assumption that the explanandum is true 
provides an indispensable part of the only available evidential support for one 
of the explanans statements” (Hempel, 1965:373). For exemple, from the 
presence of smoke and the knowledge that smoke is caused by fire, the 
hypothesis that a fire is occuring can be inferred. In this case, the evidence 
that the smoke is present or the assumption of the presence of smoke is 
necessary to infer the presence of the fire.
To infer a hypothesis, the brain relies on the construction of models of
the states of the world based on sensory information. The brain relies both on 
sensory data to build models and to test them against sensory evidence. 
Evidence are used to confirm or reject a hypothesis. These models have been 
proposed to support conscious processing when used to actively infer through 
building and testing hypotheses about the states of the world causing 
sensations (Hobson and Friston, 2016; Hobson 2018). 
1.b. Self-evidencing conscious experience is problematic  
Explaining conscious experience requires thus to infer the state of the world 
causing conscious experience and to be able to gather evidence that can allow
to confirm or reject this model. In this case, conscious experience is the 
explenandum of the self-evidencing process. If conscious processing is self-
evidencing, the hypothesis that conscious experience exists or evidence of 
conscious experience are necessary as part of the explanans to explain 
conscious experience. 
One can accept the hypothesis that conscious experience exists but 
refuse to use evidence about conscious experience to explain conscious 
experience. This corresponds to explaning conscious experience using 
information that do not presuppose consciousness, only in terms of physical 
processes. Nevertheless, explaining conscious experience uses self-evidencing
about conscious experience and as such, it uses evidence that is gathered 
leading to conscious experience.
Another one can deny the hypothesis that conscious experience exists 
and accept to use evidence produced by the self-evidencing. This situation 
triggers a particular epistemological situation as recently pointed by Francois 
Kammerer with the “illusion meta-problem” (Kammerer, 2016). Provided the 
hypothesis that conscious experience is an illusion, ie does not exist, testing 
the absence of conscious experience would require having the conscious 
experience of not having a conscious experience, which is paradoxical. 
The “illusion meta-problem” introduced here is close to the meta-
problem of consciousness because it aims to explain the strength of our 
intuition coming against the refutation of the existence of conscious 
experience. I will now demonstrate how self-evidencing precisely accounts for 
the particularity of such situation and show in a third part its relevance for 
our intuitions about consciousness.
2. The vicious circularity of self-evidencing explanation
 
2.a. The circularity of self-evidencing
Self-evidencing has been criticized to be a case of circular inference process 
since the information about the occurrence of the explenandum is used as an 
essential part of its explanans. For exemple, the presence of smoke is used 
both to infer the hypothesis of the presence of a fire and as evidence for its 
presence. 
The circularity can be limited through testing hypotheses based on 
independent sensory evidence, as noted by Hempel, “an acceptable self-
evidencing explanation benefits, as it were, by the wisdom of hindsight 
derived from the information that the explanandum event [i.e. the smoke] has 
occurred, but does not misuse that information so as to produce a circular 
explanation” (Hempel 1965:373). For exemple, the reliability of the hypothesis
of a fire happening can be increased or decreased through collecting 
independent evidence, e.g. through checking if oxygen levels are
decreasing in the surrounding atmosphere.
In this case, the epistemic circle is benign (Lipton 2004). The circle 
turns vicious, however, under a specific condition, namely when doubts arise 
about the occurrence of the evidence itself. Thus if someone doubts the 
occurrence of the smoke, it would be misguided to defend it by appeal to the 
fire, given there is only evidence for the hypothesis that there is a fire, if it 
really was smoke in the first place.
2.b. The specificity of explaining conscious experience as viciously circular
The hypothesis that the smoke is caused by the fire does not suppose a self-
evidencing process that will infer and test its existence. In this case, 
independent evidence can be easily gathered through self-evidencing to test 
the presence of smoke. But for conscious experience, since it results from 
conscious processing which is self-evidencing, acquiring evidence about the 
existence of conscious experience requires the use of self-evidencing and thus 
lead to conscious experience. Thus, the existence of conscious experience 
cannot be indenpendently tested, ie without using information about the 
occurrence of conscious experience.
Even if the hypothesis that the evidence exists cannot be tested, can 
such evidence be explained using self-evidencing ? To avoid circularity and be 
able to be tested independently, no evidence using self-evidencing can be 
gathered since no information about the occurrence of evidence must be used.
Thus, self-evidencing requires to accept the assumption that the evidence 
exists as part of one of the explanans statement. Therefore, evidence cannot 
be explained only by hypotheses that do not presuppose its existence. As such,
conscious experience cannot be explained with hypotheses that do not 
suppose the existence of conscious experience, ie only by physical 
explanations.
One could still deny the hypothesis that the evidence exists and 
accept to use information about the presence of evidence. Nevertheless, the 
hypothesis that evidence does not exist is in contradiction with the use of 
evidence using self-evidencing. Thus, the hypothesis that the evidence does 
not exist cannot be tested by the self-evidencing process without contradiction
between its existence and its use. This is the case of illusionists. By contrast, if
one accepts the hypothesis that evidence exists, such hypothesis cannot be 
independently tested but no contradiction arises. Thus the hypothesis remain 
that conscious existence does not exist, and illusionists might be true, but 
testing such hypothesis is in contradiction its use during self-evidencing. 
3. Self-evidencing consciousness as a solution to the meta-problem of 
consciousness
3.a. A topic-neutral account of the meta-problem of consciousness
My main argument is thus that :
P1. consciousness is self-evidencing 
P2. a self-evidencing process cannot prove the existence of its evidence and 
explain its evidence by the use only of hypotheses that do not suppose its 
existence
C. Thus, any conscious being cannot test the existence of its conscious 
experience or explain it without supposing its existence.
I would like to highlight in this last section how this formalization accounts for
our intuitions about conscious experience and makes several non trivial 
predictions on the role they play in the debate about the existence of 
conscious experience. Self-evidencing explanation sheds light first on why the 
meta-problem of consciousness is “a problem of explaining phenomenal 
reports in topic-neutral terms”, i.e. that do not involve conscious experience 
(Chalmers, 2019). Indeed, to avoid the problem of circularity arising from self-
evidencing, any acceptable explanation would require to be inferred from 
independent evidence, i.e. topic-neutral terms, than the phenomena which it 
tries to account for, i.e. phenomenological notions. As such, self-evidencing is 
formulated in topic-neutral terms (Hohwy, 2016; Friston, 2018). 
3.b. Epistemic and metaphysical intuitions at the core of the hard-problem
I showed how explaining the evidence of self-evidencing using self-evidencing 
represents a particular epistemic situation for which self-evidencing is 
viciously circular. Any hypothesis to explain conscious experience must not 
presuppose the existence of the conscious experience to be able to be tested 
in a way that avoid circularity. Nevertheless, I showed that conscious 
experience cannot be explained with only with hypotheses that do not suppose
its existence. This particular situation makes sense of our epistemic intuitions 
about the explanatory gap between conscious experience and physical notions
that do not suppose the existence of conscious experience.  
Self-evidencing offers indeed an account of the illusion meta-problem 
through explaining how the fact of denying the existence of conscious 
experience could not even be intuitively conceived because it would 
contradiction with the necessity to presuppose the existence of conscious 
experience to form an hypothesis. The strength of the intuition of the 
existence of conscious experience could thus be explained by the fact that the 
hypothesis that conscious experience exists does not come with such 
contradiction in its formation. Because conscious experience cannot be 
reduced to physical notions that do not suppose conscious experience and can 
be explain without contradiction only if it presupposes its existence, the 
metaphysical intuition that conscious experience exists appears to be 
fundamental. Nevertheless, self-evidencing predicts that the hypothesis that 
conscious experience exists cannot be tested. Thus the question whether 
conscious experience exists remains unsettled according to self-evidencing 
and eliminativists and illusionists might be right.
Self-evidencing explains that the epistemic and metaphysic intuitions 
come from the fact that, to explain conscious experience, the same self-
evidencing process is used to generate hypotheses and to test them. The first-
person perspective allows to form and gather evidence about the existence of 
its own conscious experience but this situation triggers a vicious circular 
inference. As an alternative, the approach to treat conscious phenomena in a 
third-person perspective has been proposed by Dennett introducing 
heterophenomenology (Dennett, 1993). This strategy exemplifies how to avoid 
circularity because phenomenal reports are not produced by the same self-
evidencing process than the one used to explain them. Thus, phenomenal 
reports can be explained as sensory data and tested in the same way as 
physical hypotheses. Such approach solves methodological problems in 
decoupling our intutions from the way to test them. But it does not prevent 
intuitions about conscious experience from emerging based on the use of self-
evidencing in a first-person perspective, nor to solve the problem of providing 
independent evidence about the existence of conscious experience using self-
evidencing.
3.c. The knowledge and modal argument and the third-person approach
In order to try to provide support for the existence of conscious experience 
from a third-person perspective, two types of arguments have been proposed :
the knowledge argument and the zombie-thought experiment. I will show how 
self-evidencing can account for these intuitions and for their role in proving 
the existence of conscious experience. While the knowledge argument 
addresses whether one can find independent evidence that conscious 
experience exists and is not reducible to physical explanations, the second one
adresses whether the hypothesis that conscious experience does not exist can 
be formed without contradiction. 
The problem of providing independent evidence that conscious 
experience exists and is not reducible to physical processes has been 
discussed with Mary’s room thought experiment (Jackson, 1982). Mary is a 
scientist in possession of all third-person knowledge regarding a physical state
of the world but has never experienced it, e.g. the red color. The argument is 
that her first sensory encouter with the red color would still provide her with 
new information that she did not possess previously that would be conscious 
experience. Self-evidencing predicts that when Mary is seeing a red color for 
the first time, independant evidence resulting from self-evidencing is gathered
to test her models of the red color. Such inference results in the conscious 
experience of red. Hence, the intuition of additive evidence linked to the 
existence of the conscious experience of red is explained by self-evidencing as 
inferring the cause of a newly encountered sensory situation. Importantly, the 
evidence obtained in the first-person perspective is here discussed in topic-
neutral terms as knowledge does not suppose the existence of conscious 
experience. The knowledge argument plays an important role in the debate by
the possibility to provide independent evidence that conscious experience 
exists without presupposing the existence of conscious experience.  
The problem whether the hypothesis that conscious experience does 
not exist can be formed without contradiction has been addressed through the
zombie thought experiment, i.e. the intuition that there can be a functionally 
equivalent counterpart of a conscious being but devoid of conscious 
experience (Chalmers, 1996). Self-evidencing predicts effectively that I can 
conceive a zombie in a third-person perspective, since no contradiction exists 
between the hypothesis that the conscious experience of the zombie does not 
exist and my conscious experience that is required when using self-
evidencing. The third-person perspective allows thus to formulate without 
contradiction the hypothesis that conscious experience does not exist, but 
does not address whether such hypothesis is actually true and can be tested. 
The self-evidencing framework informs thus both our understanding of the 
modal intuition about conscious experience and its role played in inferring the
existence of conscious experience.
4. Conclusion
Self-evidencing is an inference process that has been proposed to be at the 
core of the conscious process. I highlighted a particular epistemological case 
for which self-evidencing forms a vicious circular inference that cannot be 
solved through collecting independent evidence. I showed how this explains 
our intuitions about the irreducibility of conscious experience to physical 
states of the world that do not presuppose conscious experience. It also 
accounts for the fact that the existence of conscious experience cannot be 
proven or disproven from a subjective point of view as well as the strength of 
the intuition that conscious experience is fundamental. It gives an insight on 
the role that these intutions play in the debate about conscious experience 
and the constraint of explaining conscious experience in topic-neutral terms to
avoid the circularity of self-evidencing. Self-evidencing explanation gives thus 
an account for the particularity of our intuitions about conscious experience 
and their importance in the philosophical debate about the hard-problem of 
consciousness. Relying on consciousness as self-evidencing, I show how this 
account offers a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness and its 
explanatory power as a framework for consciousness (Hohwy, 2016; Friston, 
2018).
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